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THE IMPACT OF CIVILIAN AGGRAVATING FACTORS ON
THE MILITARY DEATH PENALTY (1984-2005): ANOTHER
CHAPTER IN THE RESISTANCE OF THE ARMED FORCES TO
THE CIVILIANIZATION OF MILITARY JUSTICE

Catherine M. Grosso*
David C. Baldus**
George Woodworth***

In 1984, the U.S. Armed Forces amended its capital punishment system for death
eligible murder to bring it into compliance with Furman v. Georgia. Those
amendments were modeled after death penalty legislation prevailing in over thirty
states. After a brief period between 1986 and 1990, the charging decisions of
commanders and the conviction and sentencing decisions of court martial members (jurors) transformed the military death penalty system into a dual system that
treats two classes of death eligible murder quite differently. Since 1990, a member
of the armed forces accused of a killing a commissioned officer or murder with a
direct impact on the ability of military commanders to run an effective and disciplined military is significantly more likely to face a capital court martial and be
sentenced to death than a similarly situated member accused of a murder connected to the military only fry the identity of the accused.
This empirical study of charging and sentencing decisions in 104 death eligible
military murders from 1984-2005 documents contemporary resistance to the
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civilianization of the military death penalty as manifest in chargi,ng and sentencing decisions. We conclude that a limitation of death eligible murder to those
directly impacting military command and control could reduce the risk of arbitrariness in the administration of the military death penalty.

INTRODUCTION

The threshold question we address in this Article is the extent to
which the administration of the military death penalty since 1984
has followed the civilian model of limiting death sentences to the
most aggravated cases, as defined by a 1984 executive order delineating death eligible murder for the U.S. Armed Forces, or
whether practice has overridden the reforms and voided the intended civilianizing influence. 1
This analysis is based on an empirical study of the administration of the death penalty by the U.S. Armed Forces since 1984 for
premeditated and felony murder committed by United States mili2
tary personnel. Our data include the prosecution of 104 death
eligible cases from 1984 through 2005, which resulted in the imposition of fifteen death sentences. 3 We find an abrupt distinction
between the charging and sentencing practices in the first six years
after the 1984 order and the charging and sentencing practices
after 1990. After 1990, charging and sentencing practices turned
much of the civilianizing aspects of the 1984 executive order into
dead letter law.
Since the founding of the Republic, the military criminal justice
system stood as a system apart, a system designed to advance the
needs of military commanders for efficient and effective control of
soldiers, airmen, sailors, and marines. The military system has consistently lagged behind its civilian counterparts in its concern for
the broad protections associated with the Bill of Rights. While
many in military command worked to incorporate the protections
of the Bill of Rights into military criminal justice over time, other
military leaders have resisted such changes as unnecessary "civilianizing" and a direct threat to their ability to run a proper military.
This empirical study documents contemporary resistance in the
U.S. Armed Forces to civilianizing changes in the context of capital
1.
Exec. Order No. 12,473, 49 Fed. Reg. 17152 (Apr. 13, 1984).
2.
Data is presented in tables and figures following the conclusion of this Article.
3.
None of these offenders has been executed. The last military execution occurred
in 1961. See Death Penalty Information Center, The U.S. Military Death Penalty,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/us-military-death-penalty#facts (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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punishment. Our study shows that the charging decisions of commanders and the conviction and sentencing decisions of court
martial members (jurors) since 1990 have essentially nullified the
deliberate adoption in 1984 of a military death sentencing system
modeled after those prevailing in over 30 states. These actors have
transformed the military death penalty system into a dual system
that treats quite differently two classes of death eligible murder.
The first class ("military murder") directly impacts the capacity of
military commanders to run an effective and disciplined military.
Prominent among military murders are murders of commissioned
and non-commissioned officers and large scale attacks on fellow
troops. The second class of "civilian-style murders," such as felony
murder, murders with multiple victims, and particularly heinous
killings, have no impact on military command and control.
Since 1990, a soldier accused of civilian-style murder is significantly less likely to face a capital court martial, to receive a capital
conviction, and to be sentenced to death than a similarly situated
soldier accused of military murder. After 1990, only one of eight
military death sentences has involved a civilian-style murder. 4 Given
this reality, this Article queries whether it would be appropriate to
recognize this de facto transformation by amending military death
penalty law to bring it back in line with the central purpose of the
military criminal justice system, that of advancing command and
control of the armed forces.
Part II of this Article documents the overall history of resistance
to the civilianization of military criminal procedure in the U.S.
Armed Forces. Part III provides details of capital punishment law
in the U.S. Armed Forces between 1984 and 2005 and then explains the underlying structure of the study. Part IV documents
that in the first six years of the new system civilian-style murders
were identified as sufficiently culpable for capital prosecution and
death sentences, while after 1990 they disappear almost entirely
from capital cases. In contrast, military murders exist as a unique
subset of cases, worthy of the most aggressive prosecution and sentencing. This Part also demonstrates that this disparate treatment
cannot be explained by different culpability levels in the cases. Part
V presents possible policy explanations for the emergence of this
disparate treatment in the post-1990 period. Part VI offers brief
conclusions and recommendations for addressing the problems
that arise when such disparate treatment exists.

4.

See Table 3, Lines 9-15 (showing only Witt, Line 14, to be civilian-style).
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THEME OF RESISTANCE: THE SLOW CIVILIANIZATION
OF COURTS MARTIAL

There is a history of resistance by some military leaders to efforts
5
to "civilianize" the military criminal justice system. This resistance
appeared most famously during the 1920s in the office of the
Judge Advocate General of the Army over the availability of appeal
from certain court martial cases. 6 Commanders resisting such
change perceive the military criminal justice system principally as a
means of promoting discipline to protect the authority and effectiveness of the military command and view efforts to civilianize the
military system as a threat to those goals.' This tension pits the
8
"demands of discipline" against "the requirements of justice."
9
Courts martial are Article I rather than Article III courts. As
such, courts martial were not established along the same guidelines
10
or, really, for the same purpose as civilian courts. Courts martial
are an extension of the executive power (provided by Congress) to
11
aid the President in maintaining discipline in the armed forces.
Courts martial form an essential part of a commander's tools for
maintaining effective command and control.
Accordingly, courts martial historically have not been held to the
same due process standards as civilian courts. While many of the
5.
Here, "civilianize" refers to the procedural protections imported from the civilian
courts in an effort to reform the military system.
6.
See generally JOHN M. LINDLEY, "A SOLDIER IS ALso A CITIZEN": THE CONTROVERSY
OVER MILITARY JUSTICE, 1917-1920 (1990).
7.
For example, William Winthrop, "the greatest departmental authority upon Military Law," stated in 1886 that "Courts-martial are not courts, but are, in fact, simply
instrumentalities of the executive power provided by Congress for the President as Commander-in.Chief to aid him in properly commanding the army and enforcing discipline
therein." S.T. Ansell, 5 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 5-6 (1919) (citing 1 WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY
LAw 52-53 (1886) ); see also LINDLEY, supra note 6, at 27 (summarizing the opposition within
the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Army to civilianizing reforms), 67 (reporting a proposed revision to the Articles of War in 1916 that would expand the jurisdiction of
courts martial to more common law offenses but simultaneously would increase the isolation
of military law from civilian law).
8.
Kevin]. Barry, A Face Lift (And Much More) for an Aging Beauty: The Cox Commission
Recommendations to Rejuvenate the Uniform Code of Military justice, 2002 L. REv. MICH. ST. U.
DETROIT C.L. 57, 67.
9.
Robert D. Duke & Howard S. Vogel, The Constitution and the Standing Anny: Another
Problem ofCourt-Martialjurisdiction, 13 VAND. L. REv. 435, 440 (1960).
10.
See Willenbring v. Neurauter, 48 MJ. 152, 157 (C.A.A.F. 1998) ("[I]t is well established that courts-martial-which are authorized by statutes enacted pursuant to Article I of
the Constitution-need not provide a military accused with the same procedural rights
available to a civilian defendant in a criminal trial conducted under Article III.").
11.
See Jonathan Turley, Tribunals and Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of Military
Guuernance in a Madisonian Democracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 649, 665 (2002) ("Despite periodic reforms, the military justice system, like the military system as a whole, has long been
viewed as an extension of the Executive Branch to serve its military needs.").
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protections of the Bill of Rights have been applied to the military
through statute, 12 civilianizing changes typically have been resisted
by military personnel. As early as 1912, the Judge Advocate General
of the Army stated in a Congressional committee hearing that "the
introduction of fundamental principles of civil jurisprudence into
13
the administration of military justice is to be discouraged. " In subsequent testimony, the Judge Advocate General of the Army
emphasized again that a court martial must be-first and foremost-the tool by which a commander maintains discipline and
14
control. A thorough history of the courts martial system and efforts to "civilianize" the system over the past century, by Kevin].
Barry (Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Ret.), casts these efforts as long,
hard-fought battles met with great resistance by the military. 15

A. Resistance in the Non-Capital Context
In the non-capital context, military leaders have resisted a number of civilianizing reforms. These leaders perceived the adoption
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) in 1950 as unnecessarily imposing civilian procedures on military courts for the
"primary purpose" of "creat[ing] a system that would be regarded
with favor by the public, which would earn and hold the public's
confidence." 16 Officers raised concerns that adopting the UCMJ
"made the effective [and efficient] administration of military disci17
pline within the Armed Forces more difficult." Colonel Frederick
Wiener, who was at one time a strong voice for those opposing civilianizing changes, argued that the requirement that the accused
in a military trial be represented by qualified lawyers (as imposed
18
by the UCMJ in 1950) was unnecessary and impractical. At least
12.
Frederick Bernays Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice
II, 72 HARV. L. REv. 266, 294-96 (1958).
13.
Ansell, supra note 7, at 7 (quoting from hearings before Congress in 1912 without
providing citation).
14.
See Lindley, supra note 6, at 66-68.
15.
See Barry, supra note 8, at 67-69.
16.
George S. Prugh, Jr., Observations on the Uniform Code of Military justice: 1954 and
2000, 165 MIL. L. REv. 21, 25 (2000).
17.
Id. at 29-30 (quoting a 1953 report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Future of
Military Service as a Career).
18.
Barry, supra note 8, at 72 n.48. Wiener later argued that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel does not apply to the military justice system. Frederick Bernays Wiener,
Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice 1, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1, 49 (1958). At
the same time, in a second 1958 paper, Wiener wrote with favor about the rights accorded
members of the military by Congress and seemed to approve of the reforms. See Wiener,
supra note 12, at 303-04.
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one officer argued, "The pendulum has swung ... from too much
emphasis on the 'military' aspect of military justice to too much
19
emphasis on the civilian procedural aspects oflaw."
20
While acceptance of the UCMJ grew over time, the resistance
to imposing civilian procedures and protections on military justice
continues until today. This is reflected in resistance to suggestions
by the 2001 Commission on the 50'h Anniversary of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (the "Cox Commission") that the convening authority, a senior officer who functions as the prosecutor in
military cases, relinquish control over the selection of the members
21
who serve in courts martial. The Cox Commission recommended
limiting the role of the convening authority, commenting that "the
far-reaching role of commanding officers in the court-martial
process remains the greatest barrier to operating a fair system of
criminal justice within the armed forces." 22 This recommendation
reflects the concern that members may feel the need to vote to
convict the accused to curry favor with their commanding officer
who, in fact, prosecutes the case.
The Cox Commission report anticipated that this recommendation would engender controversy, 23 and it did. Scholars argued that
limiting the role of the convening authority would be inconsistent
24
with the needs of military command. No action has been taken to
implement this recommendation.

19.
Prugh, supra note 16, at 30.
20.
Id. at 40 (observing in 2000 that "[w]hile the UCMJ deliberately tended to 'civilianize' the court-martial system, that presented no difficulty for the senior judge advocates and
for the junior officers it presented a welcome professional challenge").
21.
See WALTER T. Cox III ET AL., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE§ III.A (2001) (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/nimj/
documents/cox_comm_report2.pdf?rd=l.
22.
Id. at 6.
23.
The commission reported that a recent study by the Committee on Military Justice
at the Department of Defense had recommended against making any changes to the convening officer's responsibilities. See id. at 8; see al.so Barry, supra note 8, at 101.
24.
See, e.g., Christopher W. Behan, Don't Tug on Superman s Cape: In Defense of Convening
Authurity Selection and Appointment of Court-Martial Panel Members, 176 MIL. L. REv. 190, 25762 (2003) (noting that the proposed reform inadequately address the needs of military
command); Theodore Essex & Leslea Tate Pickle, A Reply to the Report of the Commission on the
50th Anniversary of the Unifonn Code of Military justice (May 2001): "The Cox Commission", 52 AF.
L. REv. 233, 248--50 (2002) (same).

SPRING

2010]

The Impact of Civilian Aggravating Factors

575

B. Resistance in the Capital Punishment Context

1. Death Eligible Offenses Under the Uniform Code
of Military Justice
There is a long tradition of the use of capital punishment in the
American armed forces. There are currently fourteen death eligi25
ble offenses in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. All but two
of them currently relate to crimes with important national security
or military implications which have no counterparts in civilian
death penalty systems. Mutiny, sedition, and espionage are all in26
cluded in the national security category. There are also eight
death eligible offenses with serious military implications that apply
only "in time of war" or during combat operations against a foreign
27
power, and two other offenses with important military implica28
tions that have no "time of war" requirement. These are long
standing offenses that to our knowledge have not been applied
29
since the Korean War.
The thirteenth and fourteenth death eligible offenses are mur30
31
der (premeditated and felony murder) and rape committed by
25.
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-950 (2006).
26.
UCMJ §§ 894 (mutiny or sedition), 906a (espionage).
27.
UCMJ §§ 885 (desertion), 890 (assaulting or willfully disobeying a superior commissioned officer), 899 (misbehavior before the enemy), 900 (subordinate compelling
surrender), 901 (improper use of countersign), 904 (aiding the enemy), 906 (spies), 913
(misbehavior of a sentinel).
28.
UCMJ §§ 902 (forcing a safeguard), 910 (improper hazarding of vessel).
29.
The Court of Military Appeals treated the Korean and Vietnam conflicts quite differently. Compare United States v. Bancroft, 3 C.M.A. 3, 11 C.M.R. 3 (1953), with United
States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363, 41 C.M.R. 363 (1970).
30.
Article 118 of the UCMJ as adopted in 1950 reads as follows:
Any person subject to this code who, without justification or excuse, unlawfully kills a
human being, when he( 1)

has a premeditated design to kill; or

(2)

intends to kill or inflict great bodily harm; or

(3)

is engaged in an act which is inherently dangerous to others and
evinces a wanton disregard of human life; or

(4)

is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of burglary,
sodomy, rape, robbery, or aggravated arson;

is guilty of murder, and shall suffer such punishment as a court-martial may direct,
except that if found guilty under paragraph (1) or (4) of this article, he shall suffer
death or imprisonment for life as a court-martial may direct.
UCMJ, Pub. L. No. 81-506, ch. 169, art. 118, 64 Stat. 107, 140 (1950).
31.
UCM.J, art. 120. The current UCM.J also defines rape as an offense punishable by
death. UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2006). The only service member executed for rape since
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American military personnel during peacetime anywhere in the
world. 32 A murder conviction is the basis of all of the military death
sentences imposed since 1960. With one exception, 33 murder and
rape are the most recently established death eligible military offense having been enacted in 1950 by the UCMJ.
Death eligibility for murder requires no connection between the
murder and military interests or functions. Military status alone
makes the statute applicable to military personnel and gives mili34
tary courts martial jurisdiction. In terms of the definition of
1950 was Pvt. John Bennett, who was convicted of rape and attempted murder and executed
in 1961. See 2 FRANCIS A GILLIGAN & FREDRIC I. LEDERER, COURT-MARTIAL PROCEDURE
§ 23-32.10 (3d ed. 2006). Since that time, the United States Supreme Court held in Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), that the death penalty is unconstitutional as excessive punishment for the rape of an adult woman. Military courts have held that Coker applies to military
law, at least when applied to rape of an adult woman. United States v. McReynolds, 9 MJ.
881, 882 (A.F.C.M.R. 1980) (holding that rape of an adult woman is not a capital offense).
Moreover, use of the death penalty as punishment for the rape of a child under 12 years of
age, authorized by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-163, § 552, 119 Stat. 3136, 3257 (amending 10 U.S.C. § 920(b) (2) (2006) ), was recently
invalidated by the United States Supreme Court. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641
(2008). However, in a denial of rehearing which expressly discussed Article 120 of the
UCMJ, the Court leaves the door open to capital prosecutions under that article. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2008) (opinion of Kennedy,J.,joined by Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, Breyer,JJ., respecting denial ofreconsideration) ("[W]e need not decide whether
certain considerations might justify differences in the application of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause to military cases (a matter not presented here for our decision)."). No
current member of military death row has been convicted of rape alone. Compare Table 3
(Lines 5, 7, 10, 14, 15), with CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROJECT, NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATION FUND, INC., DEATH Row U.S.A. 67 (Winter 2009) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http:/ /www.naacpldf.org/ content/pdf/pubs/
drusa/DRUSA_Winter_2009.pdf.
32.
Courts martial were first granted jurisdiction to try murder and rape cases during
the Civil War when these acts were "committed by persons who are in the military service of
the United States" during "time [s] of war, insurrection, or rebellion." Act of Mar. 3, 1863,
ch. 75, § 30, 12 Stat. 731, 736. In 1916, an amendment to the Articles of War added that "no
person shall be tried by court-martial for murder or rape committed within the geographical
limits of the States ... and the District of Columbia in time of peace." Act of Aug. 29, 1916,
ch. 418, art. 92, 39 Stat. 619, 664. These provisions which denied courts martial jurisdiction
to try murder and rape offenses when committed within the geographical limits of the
United States during times of peace survived many revisions to the Articles of War, including
the Elston Act in 1948. Elston Act (Selective Service Act), ch. 625, § 235, 62 Stat. 604, 640
(1948). It was not until the adoption of the UCMJ in 1950 that courts martial were granted
the jurisdiction to try crimes of murder and rape committed in the United States during
peacetime. UCMJ, Pub. L. No. 81-506, ch. 169, art. ll8, 120, 64 Stat. 107, 140 (1950) (current version at 10 U.S.C. § 918, 920 (2006)). Two U.S. Courts of Appeal have affirmed that
courts martial have jurisdiction to prosecute a capital offense in peacetime under the UCMJ.
Owens v. Markley, 289 F.2d 751, 752 (7th Cir. 1961); Burns v. Taylor, 274 F.2d 141, 143 (10th
Cir. 1959).
33.
There appears to be one capital crime--espionage-that was added since 1950. It
was created by the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-145, 99
Stat. 583, 634 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 906a).
34.
Although the Supreme Court during the late 1960s in O'Callahan v. Parker, 395
U.S. 258, 272-73 (1969), found that courts martial only had jurisdiction to try servicemen
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capital murder, therefore, the UCMJ mirrored the provisions of
typical 1950s civilian death penalty statutes that defined first de35
gree and felony murder as capital offenses. During this period of
time, the military system also shared in common with all civilian
systems complete and untrammeled discretion of the sentencing
authority on the issue of whether the sentence for capital murder
should be death or life imprisonment. 36

2. Resistance to Furman v. Georgia (1972)
The broad sentencing discretion of court martial members became particularly salient after Furman v. Georgia, which held that
the unguided discretion of sentencing authorities in civilian jurisdictions violates the cruel and unusual punishments provision of
37
the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Furman
invalidated state death penalty statutes across the United States,
but the majority opinions did not address its applicability to military courts. Nevertheless, little thought would be required to
recognize that the Court's Furman concerns about the risks of unbridled discretion of sentencing authorities applied with equal
38
force to the military system. Despite a suggestion to this effect by
39
Justices Powell and Blackmun, dissenting in Furman, and Justice
Marshall, dissenting in the case of Schick v. Reed two years later, 40
neither Congress nor the President made any effort to reform military law or procedures.
Shortly thereafter, the United States Supreme Court ruled in
Gregg v. Georgia (1976) and Profitt v. Florida (1976) that the adoption of statutory lists of aggravating circumstances comparable to
those found in the Model Penal Code 41 and the use of bifurcated
when the crime had a "service connection," the Court abandoned the "service connection"
requirement in 1987, in Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 439 (1987), which held that
court martial jurisdiction was established by one factor-the military status of the accused.
35.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 921.141 (West Supp. 2009); GA. CODE. ANN.§ 17-10-30
(2008); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 9711(West2007).
36.
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart,]., concurring).
37.
Id. at 239-40.
38.
SeeUCtvij, Pub. L. No. 81-506, ch. 169, art. 118, 120, 64 Stat. 107, 140 (1950).
39.
Justice Powell, dissenting in Funnan, argued that the case voided military capital
punishment law. Furman, 408 U.S. at 417-18 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[N]umerous provisions of the ... Uniform Code of Military Justice also are voided."). Justice Blackmun made
the same argument. Id. at 412 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) ("Also in jeopardy, perhaps, are the
death penalty provisions in various Articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.").
40.
419 U.S. 256, 271 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (concluding that a military
death sentence should be unconstitutional under Funnan).
41.
MODEL PENAL CODE§ 210.6 (1980).
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guilt and penalty trials satisfied the requirements of the Eighth
Amendment because they materially reduced the breadth of capi42
tal charging discretion. In the Court's view, these reforms limited
death sentences to the most aggravated cases, thereby eliminating
the risk of arbitrariness and discrimination in the administration of
43
capital punishment.
In 1981, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review denied
44
the applicability of Furman to the military. First, the court found
that military law, while not notably distinguishable from the unconstitutional civilian capital punishment laws, had to be
45
understood in the context of the military justice system. The
court held that the military justice system itself mitigated any risk
of arbitrary decision making. 46 The court continued to reason that
the procedures in place arose from the needs of commanders "to
establish and maintain the armed forces" and should be seen as
part of "the peculiar requirements which flow from a disciplined,
47
ever-ready and effective military community." This argument echoes the civilian/military divide presented above. Again, the military
set itself apart because of the needs inherent in commanding and
controlling the armed forces.
A June 1983 Air Force Court of Military Review ruling was the
first to hold that Furrnan's requirements applied to courts martial
and that the court martial system was not in compliance with those
48
requirements. In October 1983, the Court of Military Appeals settled the conflict between the lower military courts, ruling that
49
Furman applied to courts martial.

42.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
43.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 194-95; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 251.
44.
United States v. Rojas, 15 MJ. 902 (N.M.C.M.R. 1983) (sentence adjudged Jan. 30,
1981).
45.
Id. at 928-29 (noting that "comparison of literal statute provisions" would not suffice for determining whether Furman required changes because "[t]he death penalty is
imposed and administered in the military justice system under procedures established by
Congress and the President in the UC!'-0 and [Manual for Courts-Martial], respectively.").
46.
Id.
47.
Id. at 929; see also United States v. Matthews, 13 MJ. 501 (A.C.M.R. 1982) (en bane)
(holding that the military procedures fulfilled Furman's requirements).
48.
United States v. Gay, 16 MJ. 586, 596 (A.F.C.M.R. 1983) (en bane).
49.
United States v. Matthews, 16 MJ. 354 (C.M.A. 1983). In 1984, the appeal in Gay
reached the Court of Military Appeals, which affirmed the decision. United States v. Gay, 18
MJ. 104 (C.M.A. 1984).
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3. Facial Accommodation of Furman v. Georgi,a ( 1972)
To cure the defect in the military system recognized by the military courts, President Reagan requested that his legal advisors,
presumably in the Pentagon and the Department ofJustice, amend
military law to bring it into conformity with the requirements of
the Eighth Amendment.
The product was a 1984 executive order that limited death eligibility to capital cases in which the fact finder determined that one
or more statutory aggravating circumstances was present in the
case and that "any extenuating or mitigating circumstances are
50
substantially outweighed by any aggravating circumstances." The
aggravating circumstances, known as aggravating "factors" in current military parlance, embrace a number of situations with
distinct military and national security implications that facially apply to all death eligible offenses, but in practice have no
applicability to "civilian-style" premeditated and felony murders,
which constitute the vast majority of death eligible murders com51
mitted by military personnel in peacetime. One distinctly military
aggravating circumstance applies to murder and rape "committed
in time of war," a condition that has not existed since the Korean
War. 52
The executive order does, however, specifically exclude from
murder offenses two omnibus aggravators with significant military
implications. 53 In fact, only one of the omnibus aggravators applicable to all death eligible offenses (grave risk to non-decedent
54
victims) has clear relevance to murder cases.
The executive order also defines for premeditated murder cases
an extensive list of distinctly civilian-style aggravating

. 50.
Exec. Order No. 12,460, 49 Fed. Reg. 3169 Uan. 24, 1984) (Amendments to the
Manual for Courts Martial).
51.
Id. §§ (3) (b) (accused had intent (i) to "cause substantial damage to the national
security of the United States," or (ii) to "cause substantial damage to a mission, system, or
function of the United States" if such damage "would have resulted had the intended damage been effected"), (3) (e) ("the accused committed the offense with the intent to avoid
hazardous duty"); see infra Part III-D (discussing the distinction between "military" and "civilian-style" murders within the military criminal justice system).
52.
Exec. Order No. 12,460, 49 Fed. Reg. 3170 Uan. 24, 1984) (Amendments to the
Manual for Courts Martial) (crime committed "in time of war" when the United States or an
ally is an "occupying power" or United States forces were "then engaged in active hostilities").
53.
Id.§§ (3) (a) (the crime was "committed before or in the presence of the enemy"),
(3) (c) ("the offense caused substantial damage to the national security of the United States,
whether or not the accused intended such damage").
54.
Id. at § (3)(d) ("[T]he lives of persons other than the victim, if any, were unlawfully and substantially endangered.").
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circumstances. 55 These aggravating circumstances were clearly inspired by the typical state death penalty statute whose aggravating
circumstances are modeled after those found in the Model Penal
Code. 56 The executive order's focus on civilian-style aggravating
circumstances for premeditated murder was understandable given
that six of the seven murder cases from the military in which a
death sentence had been imposed between 1979 and 1984 involved
a distinctly civilian-style murder with no special military implications.57

In fact, only one part of one of the premeditated murder aggravating circumstances in the executive order is uniquely tailored to
military circumstances. This aggravator, "7G," classifies as death
eligible the premeditated murder of a "commissioned, warrant,
noncommissioned, or petty officer of the armed services of the
United States" killed "in the execution of office" when the accused
58
had knowledge of the victim's status. The remainder of the 7G
aggravating factor reflects an effort to provide special protection
for law enforcement and corrections officers that is found in most
59
civilian jurisdictions.
The executive order does not list specific mitigating circumstances, which put the military system in the company of the
Georgia system approved by the Supreme Court in Gregg v. Geor-

55.
For Article 118(1) premeditated murder, § 3(g) defines the following aggravating
circumstances: (i) accused committed offense while already under confinement for thirty or
more years, (ii) felony murder, (iii) pecuniary motive, (iv) compulsion or contract murder,
(v) escape or avoid apprehension, (vi) victim an important federal official, (vii) victim a
commissioned or noncommissioned officer knowingly killed "in the execution of office"
(also known as the "7G" aggravator), (viii) obstruction of justice, (ix) infliction of substantial
pain and suffering, and (x) multiple victims. Id. at 3170-71. Section 3(h) of the order also
defines one aggravating circumstance limited to felony murder alone-"the accused was the
actual perpetrator of the killing." Id. at 3171.
56.
MODEL PENAL CODE§ 210.6 (1980).
57.
The exception is United States v. Gay, 16 MJ. 586 (A.F.C.M.R. 1983) (involving two
victims, one of whom was an officer killed in the line of duty). The civilian-style death sentences included: United States v. Mustafa, 22 MJ. 165 (C.M.A. 1986) (acquaintance rape);
United States v. Artis, 22 MJ. 15 (C.M.A 1986) (wife victim); United States v. Redmond, 21
MJ. 319 (C.M.A. 1986) (killed fiancee of a friend); United States v. Hutchinson, 15 MJ.
1056 (N.M.C.M.R. 1983) (acquaintance robbery); United States v. Matthews, 16 MJ. 354
(C.M.A. 1983) (rape and robbery); United States v. Rojas, 15 MJ. 902 (N.M.C.M.R. 1983)
(acquaintance robbery).
58.
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES, R.C.M. l004(c)(7)(G) (2008)
[hereinafter Rule 1004]; see also supra note 55 (listing all of the aggravating circumstances
tailored to premeditated murder).
59.
Although the text of 7G protects all "officers" (i.e., commissioned, noncommissioned, and police officers), within military culture, as reflected in the cases studied here, an
"officer victim" case is strictly perceived to be one with a commissioned officer victimwhether or not the officer was acting in the "execution of office" and whether or not the
accused knew that the victim was a commissioned officer.
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60

gi,a. On this basis, military lawyers could properly advise their
commanders that the military system now available for the capital
prosecution of premeditated and felony murder was in full compliance with Furman and fully civilianized by virtue of the civilianstyle aggravating factors on which it was based.
The findings of the empirical research presented in this Article
reveal that for its first five years of application, the military system
closely resembled the typical civilian system. However, since 1990,
military charging and sentencing authorities have de facto created
a dual system which treats quite differently ordinary civilian-style
murders from murder with military implications that threaten military discipline and the effectiveness of the military mission. It is a
story of the military's resistance to the full civilianization of capital
punishment on the ground.

III.

DATA COLLECTION AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

This Part describes the data used in this study. It then presents
military capital punishment law and decision making in death eligible murder cases in the military during the period of the study.
Finally, it explains our method for distinguishing uniquely "military" murder from ordinary civilian-style murder for the purposes
of this study.

A. Data Collection

We collected the data for this study as part of an analysis of the
role of race and other extra-legal factors in the U.S. armed forces'
capital punishment system. The sample includes all 104 death eligible cases prosecuted by the armed forces between 1984 and
61
2005. To be considered death eligible, the accused must have
committed premeditated or felony murder and there must be one
or more aggravators present in the case. For each case, the data file
includes more than 200 variables relating to the characteristics of
the accused and victim(s), the nature of the crime, the case presented against the accused, the defense presented, as well as any
mitigation presented or available, and each significant charging or
sentencing recommendation or decision in the case. In addition,
60.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
61.
In eight cases, the accused were acquitted of capital murder by members. These
cases are included in descriptive statistics about the dataset and in analyses of convening
authority charging decisions. They are otherwise excluded from the analysis.
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the data includes a detailed narrative summary of each case. We
tailored our data collection to enable accurate analysis of death
eligible murders and precise analysis of key decision points in the
military capital punishment system.

B. Death Eligible Murder in the U.S. Armed Forces

The UCMJ authorizes the death penalty as a discretionary punishment for premeditated and felony murder committed by
62
military personnel anywhere in the world. Peacetime death eligibility requires no connection between the murder and military
63
interests or functions. The UCMJ mirrors the provisions of typicai
civilian death penalty statutes, except that it also authorizes the
64
65
death penalty for rape and certain non-homicidal crimes. All of
the cases included in this study involved murder.
Rule 1004 of the Manual for Courts-Martial, the rule created by
President Reagan's executive order in 1984, limits death eligibility
by requiring a finding of aggravating circumstances similar to those
found in many civilian jurisdictions and the Model Penal Code. In
cases involving a felony murder conviction, Rule 1004(c) defines
66
separate aggravating factors. These aggravating factors, listed in
67
Table 1, also mirror those in a majority of civilianjurisdictions.
The only aggravating factor for murder that is uniquely tailored
to military circumstances is the portion of the officer victim aggra~
vating factor68 which classifies as death eligible the premeditated
murder of a "commissioned, warrant, noncommissioned, or petty
officer of the armed services of the United States" who is killed "in
the execution of office" when the accused had knowledge of the
62.
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 918 (2006).
63.
See supra note 34 for a discussion of the Supreme Court's abandonment of the
"service connection" requirement.
64.
UCMJ, art. 120, 10 U.S.C. § 920(a) (2006) ("Any person subject to this chapter
who commits an act of sexual intercourse, by force and without consent, is guilty of rape and
shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct."). Congress amended Article 120 in 2006 and the amendments took effect in October 2007.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 552(a)(l),
119 Stat. 3136, 3256-57. It still authorizes the death penalty for rape. Id.
65.
A number of non-homicidal military crimes remain death eligible in military
courts only in times of war. UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 885, 890, 901, 906, 913 (2006). An additional
list of non-homicidal military-specific crimes codified in the UCMJ does not explicitly require that the offense be committed during wartime for a death sentence to be applicable.
Id.§§ 894, 899, 900, 902, 904, 906a, 910.
66.
Rule 1004(c).
67.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 921.141 (5) (West Supp. 2009); GA. CooE. ANN. § l 7-1030(b) (2008); 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN.§ 9711 (d) (West 2007).
68.
See infra Table 1, Line 7.
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victim's status. 69 The remainder of this aggravating factor reflects
an effort to provide special protection for law enforcement and
corrections officers that is found in most civilianjurisdictions. 70
As a condition for imposing a death sentence, court martial
members must find "beyond a reasonable doubt" that one or more
"aggravating factors" exist and that "any extenuating or mitigating
circumstances are substantially outweighed by any aggravating circumstances. "71 The rule does not list specific mitigating
circumstances. Rather, it provides that the accused "shall be given
broad latitude to present evidence in extenuation and mitigation."72 Nothing in the text of the UCMJ or relevant rules suggests
that murders that threaten the command and control of the military should be considered more punitively than civilian murders.

C. Decision-Making in Death Eligi,ble Cases
Under military law and practice, the death penalty statute is applied in a three-stage process by two decision-makers-the
convening authority and the court martial members. The three
73
stages are depicted in Figure l.
A capital prosecution in a death eligible case is commenced by
the "convening authority"-normally a general or admiral in the
accused's command-who has total discretion whether or not to
seek a death sentence in a death eligible case. A decision to seek a
death sentence in the case is known as a "capital referral," a decision that is heavily influenced by the "advice" letter of the
74
commander's StaffJudge Advocate ("SJA"), his chieflegal advisor.
69.
Rule 1004(c) (7) (G). Although the understanding of military "officer" under the
section appears to include commissioned, noncommissioned, and police officers, within
military culture, as reflected in the cases studied here, an "officer victim" case is strictly perceived to be one with a commissioned officer victim-whether or not the officer was acting
in the "execution of office" and whether or not the accused knew that the victim was a
commissioned officer.
70.
See supra note 67.
71.
Rule 1004(b)(4)(C), (c). The rule uses the phrase "aggravating factors" in most instances. In section (b)(4)(C), "aggravating circumstances" includes the aggravating factors
discussed above. Id.
72.
Rule 1004(b) (3).
73.
See GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note 31, § 23-32.10 (providing details of the capital
punishment procedures).
74.
See id. The "R'" between the SJA's recommendation and the commander's referral
is .74. Article 34 advice letters take a variety of forms. Some provide an explicit recommendation in the letter. Often, however, the letter makes no mention of a capital referral but the
SJA prepares a charge sheet with the choice indicated and informs the commanding officer
that signing the sheet will implement the SJA's recommendation. In a few cases, the letter
tells the convening authority what must exist factually to justify a capital referral with no
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If a case is capitally charged and the capital referral is not withdrawn by the convening authority, the case advances to a capital
court martial with the government seeking a death sentence (Stage
75
2) . A unanimous finding of guilt by the court members advances
76
a case to a capital sentencing hearing (Stage 3). Finally, court
martial members consider the aggravating factors and mitigating
circumstances and make a life or death determination. Since November 18, 1997, the life sentence option has included a life
77
sentence without the possibility of parole.
The appellate process following the imposition of a death sentence commences with a request for clemency considered by the
convening authority who has complete discretion to reduce both
78
the crime of conviction and punishment. The convening authorities disallowed the death sentence in 2 of the 15 death sentences
that have been issued by military courts since 1984. No comparable
authority exists in civilian courts.
For death sentences approved by the convening authority, appeals are addressed to the branch specific courts of criminal

suggestion of what the referral should be. (The R' is a measure of how well the analysis describes the relationship between two variables. In this case, the variables are the SJA's
recommendation and the commander's referral. R' is always between zero and one. The
closer the R' is to the number one, the tighter the relationship between the two variables.)
75.
See id. In many cases that are not charged capitally, the decision of the convening
authority not to bring a capital case is based on a plea bargain in which the accused pleads
guilty in exchange for the convening authority's waiver of the death penalty. In capitally
charged cases, the capital charge is often withdrawn by the convening authority in exchange
for a guilty plea to the crime charged or a less serious offense, in which event the accused
escapes the risk of his or her case advancing to a capital sentencing hearing with the government seeking a death sentence. In contrast to civilian courts, a military accused's case
may not advance to a capital sentencing hearing on the basis of a guilty plea. If the government seeks a death sentence, the case must be tried and sentenced by members.
A crucial feature of the military system distinguishing it from its civilian counterparts is
that plea bargains are strictly within the authority of the convening authority rather than the
judge advocates who prosecute the cases on behalf of the government or the military judges
who try the cases. Military prosecutors may on their own motion initiate plea negotiations
leading to a waiver of the death penalty and may propose such an agreement to the convening authority, but no plea bargain involving a waiver of the death penalty can go forward
without the personal consent of the convening authority.
76.
Rule 1004(a)(2) makes a condition precedent for the imposition of a death sentence the accused's conviction of capital murder "by the concurrence of all the members of
the court-martial." Approximately 25% of the factually death eligible accused whose cases
advance to a capital court martial escape the risk of a death sentence at this stage of the
process by virtue of a non-unanimous finding of guilt or a finding of not guilty on the capital
murder charge.
77.
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 856a (2006). This was added by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-85, § 581 (a) (1), 111 Stat. 1629, 1759 (1997).
78.
See GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note 31. The convening authority also has the
power to reduce a life sentence to a term of years.
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appeals, the Court of Appeals of the Armed Forces (CAAF), and
79
then the United States Supreme Court.
This study analyzes the charging and sentencing decisions illustrated in Figure 1, namely decisions to advance death eligible cases
to a capital court martial (Stage 1), to advance the case from a
capital court martial to a capital sentencing hearing (Stage 2), and
to sentence a case to life or death (Stage 3).

D. De.fining "Military Murder"

Our analysis turns on the treatment of death eligible murders
that threaten the authority and effectiveness of the military mission
as compared to the treatment of death eligible murders which pose
no threat in this regard. As noted above, for the purposes of this
study, we designated the former a "military murder." We characterize a murder which poses no threat to the military mission and
most closely resembles a death eligible murder as prosecuted in
non-military jurisdictions as a "civilian-style" murder.so
For the purposes of our analysis, threats to the authority and effectiveness of the military mission included any case involving an
attack on a military officer and any case motivated by race, including those carried out in response to perceived racism.s 1 Cases
involving officer victims include commissioned and noncommissioned officers. These also include two cases in which the accused
attacked his military unit, killed at least one officer, and killed or
injured numerous other enlisted personnel.s2
79.
In addition, the Supreme Court exercises discretionary jurisdiction over CAAF's
decisions. UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 867a. At the present time, two death sentenced accused have
exhausted their military appeals through CAAF. In both cases, the accused have also exhausted direct appeals through the Supreme Court. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748
(1996); Gray v. United States, 51 MJ. 1 (C.A.A.F.- 1999), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 919 (2001),
reh'gdenied, 532 U.S. 1035 (2001).
80.
The degree to which military interests are implicated varies across that class of
cases. There are also two multiple-victim cases with both civilian and military murders (Kenneth Parker and Wade Walker). Individual cases in the database will be referenced by the
name of the defendant. We include these references to facilitate precise analysis and understanding of the cases. See infra Table 3, Cases 10, 11, for more information on these cases.
81.
While some have suggested that cases involving rape of a service member by a service member also ought to be perceived as threatening the effectiveness of the military
mission, the military leadership has yet to identify these crimes in this manner. See, e.g., Miles
Moffeit & Amy Herdy, Female Gis Repart Rapes in Iraq War: 37 Seek Aid After Allegations of Assaults lJy U.S. Soldiers, DENV. PosT,jan. 25, 2004, at Al; Miles Moffeit, GI Sex Cases from Iraq
Often Stall: Army Records Shuw Prosecution Rare, Reprimands from Officers Common, DENV. PosT,
Apr. 12, 2004, at Al; Eric Schmitt, Military Women Reporting Rapes lJy U.S. Soldiers, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 26, 2004, at Al.
82.
Akbar, Kruetzer.
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We categorize cases motivated by race as "military" cases because
of the importance of maintaining non-hostile interracial relations
to running the military. Maintaining interracial relations has been
a priority in the military even before the services were integrated
83
by executive order in 1948. For example, there is evidence that
during World War II the death penalty was used as a disciplinary
device to deter racial strife between black and white military units
over interracial contact between black soldiers and white women. 84
The Vietnam War, which badly strained race relations in the military,85 created a new mandate for improving race relations. Under
the new mandate, race sensitivity and race relations became "big
business"86 and concerns about race were "broadened into a gen87
eral leadership responsibility. " " [G] ood race relations" are seen
88
"as a means to readiness and combat effectiveness." Discipline is
meted out to further this end. Hate speech, for example, "incurs
sanctions only when it upsets order and discipline or provokes a
breach of the peace."89 In addition, individual branches and the
Department of Defense periodically have undertaken reviews of
race relations in the military and sought to undertake branch-wide
or service-wide reforms. 90
We coded any case that did not involve an attack on an officer or
a significant group of fellow service members and was not motivated by race as a "civilian-style" murder. The murders in these
83.
Exec. Order No. 9,981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4311, 4313 Quly 28, 1948) (establishing the
President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in Armed Services).
84.
See J. Robert Lilly & J. Michael Thomson, Executing US Soldiers in England, World War
II: Command Influence and Sexual Racism, 37 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 262, 280-83 (1997). The
armed forces stationed in England employed policies to segregate African American soldiers
from European white women after violence was anticipated and reported between African
American soldiers and white soldiers who objected to having African American soldiers
appear socially with white women. Id. at 282-83; see also ]AMES E. BLACKWELL, THE BLACK
COMMUNITY: DIVERSITY AND UNITY 223 (1975) (reviewing similar policies in France in the
same period).
85.
See generally JAMES E. WESTHEIDER, FIGHTING ON Two FRONTS: AFRICAN AMERICANS
ANDTHEVIETNAMWAR (1997).
86.
See HUMAN RELATIONS IN THE MILITARY: PROBLEMS AND PROGRAMS 58 (George
Henderson ed., 1975).
87.
CHARLES C. MOSKOS &JOHN SIBLEY BUTLER, ALL THAT WE CAN BE: BLACK LEADERSHIP AND RACIAL INTEGRATION THE ARMY WAY 53 (1996).
88.
Id. at 53 (reporting on in depth study of race relations in the Army); see also id. at 9
("[A]n officer's failure to maintain a bias-free environment is an absolute impediment to
advancement in a military career.").
89.
Id. at 65.
90.
See, e.g., DEP'T OF DEFENSE, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES (Nov. 30, 1972) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform); MosKos & BUTLER, supra note 87, at 54-63 (discussing
Army programs meant to review race relations and initiate reforms at the individual or service-wide level).
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cases had no connection to the military, other than the fact that
the accused served in the armed forces.
Table 2 presents an inventory of all of the death eligible cases in
the study, each classified and briefly described according to the
type of military or civilian-style murder that is involved in each
case. The civilian-style murders reported in Table 2 involve family
91
and acquaintance victims or a stranger victim in a felony murder. 92
The military murders involve commissioned officer victims
93
(whether or not they are acting in an official capacity) and/or a
murder that otherwise directly threatens the authority or effective94
ness of the military mission.
Military cases make up approximately 18% of the database overall, 13% of the cases in the 1984-1990 time period, and 22% of the
cases in the after-1990 time period. Civilian-style cases comprise
82% of the cases overall, 87% of the cases in the 1984-1990 time
period, and 78% of the cases after 1990. There is a slight shift toward military cases in the after-1990 time period but the two
groups largely maintain an even presence throughout the period
of the study.

N.

EVIDENCE OF DISPARATE TREATMENT OF CIVILIAN-STYLE
MURDERS AND MILITARY MURDERS

Table 3 describes the 15 cases that resulted in a death sentence
since 1984. The cases are listed in chronological order. Column B
presents a thumbnail sketch of the facts, while Columns C and D
report, respectively, the year of sentence and the coding of the case
as a civilian-style (C) or military (M) murder.
Fifty-three percent (8/15) of the death sentenced cases in Table
3 involve civilian-style murder, clearly documenting that the accused in civilian-style cases have been charged capitally and
sentenced to death in the post-1984 period. Seven of the eight
cases, however, occurred between 1984 and 1990. Civilian-style
cases composed 87% (7 /8) of the death sentenced cases in that
period. After 1990, the rate falls 39 points from 53% to 14% (1/7).
In this later period, 86% (6/7) of the death sentences were imposed in cases with military implications. This suggests that since
1990 there has been a de facto presumption against the use of
capital punishment in civilian-style murders. The only death
91.
92.
93.
94.

Gibbs, Turner, Witt, Thomas.
Dock, Loving, Gray.
Curtis, Kreutzer, Akbar, Quintanilla.
Kreutzer, Akbar, Simoy, Parker, Walker.
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sentence imposed in civilian-style murder cases since 1990 is Witt, 95
a brutal two victim case with five aggravating factors, which plausibly could overcome a strong presumption against death sentences
in civilian-style murder cases. We pursue this issue below in detail.

A. Unadjusted Disparities in the Charging and Sentencing of
Civilian-Style Murders and Military Murders

Table 4 documents disparities in charging and sentencing decisions for military and civilian-style murders from 1984 to 2005
(Part I) and until (Part II) and after (Part III) 1990. Column B of
Part I reports an overall 31-percentage point, statistically significant, military/ civilian disparity in the imposition of death
sentences among all death eligible cases. The ratio of the two rates
is 4.1 (41 %/10%). This finding closely mirrors the disparities reported in Columns C, D, and E for capital charging, capital
conviction, and death sentencing rates.
A comparison of the overall rates in Parts II and III of Column B
indicate that the overall militaryI civilian disparity reported in Part
I is entirely explained by the large 44-point disparity in the post1990 period reported in Part III. During the pre-1990 period the
death sentencing rates for the two groups of cases were essentially
the same: 25% and 21 %. The sharp decline in the death sentencing rate for civilian-style murder after 1990, from 21 % to 2%, had
the additional effect of drawing down the death sentencing rate for
all cases after 1990 from 22% to 12%.
Closer inspection of the data in Part III reveals that the 44-point
military/ civilian overall disparity in death sentencing rates reported in Column B reflects comparable disparities in both
charging and conviction decisions ( 44 and 43 points) and in the
members' death sentencing decisions (66 points), all of which are
statistically significant at the .10 level. Interestingly, however, Columns C and D of Part II report comparable military/ civilian
disparities in convening authority decisions before 1990 as well.
The big difference between the two periods is the militaryI civilian
disparity in the members' death sentencing decisions: -14 points in
the earlier period compared to +66 points in the post-1990 period.
We consider below what may have influenced the views of court
martial members about the propriety of capital punishment for
their comrades post 1990.

95.

Table 3, Case 14.
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B. Adjusted Disparities in the Chargi.ng and Sentencing of
Civilian-Style Murders and Military Murders

A possible explanation for the military/ civilian murder disparities documented in the preceding Section could be that the
civilian-style murders in the later period involve less culpable
criminal conduct than the civilian-style murders in the earlier period. The data does not support this hypothesis. Table 5 breaks
down the cases by their civilian-style or military murder status, the
number of aggravating circumstances actually found or factually
present in the case, and their date of sentencing (1984-1990 or
1991-2005). Column A marks the civilian-style cases versus the
military cases; Rows 1-4 present the civilian cases whereas Rows 5-8
present the military cases. Column B reports the number of aggravating factors, as well as the average culpability as determined by
the average number of aggravating factors for any single period.
Column C presented the cases in the earlier period, 1984-1990;
Column D presents the cases in the later period, 1991-2005.
If the military murders were overall more aggravated in terms of
the aggravating factors in the 1984 executive order, we would expect that to be reflected in the number of those factors that were
found by members in the cases that advanced to a capital sentencing hearing or were present in the cases that did not advance that
far in the process. In addition, if the decline in the overall death
sentencing rate among civilian-style murders from 21 % between
1984 and 1990 to 2% after 1990 reported in Table 4 resulted from
differences in the aggravation levels of the cases, we would expect
to see that reflected in the comparative numbers of aggravators
present in the cases during those two periods.
Table 5 shows that civilian-style cases had as many aggravators in
the later period as the earlier. Starting with the average number of
aggravating factors in Row 4, the average number of aggravating
factors in the later period (1.7), shown in Column D, Row 4, exceeds the average number in the earlier period (1.5). This increase
results from a 5-point increase in the percentage of cases with
three or more aggravating factors (8% in the earlier period, 13%
in the later period). At least with respect to the number of aggravating factors, the civilian-style cases maintain a roughly
comparable level of culpability across the study period.
Likewise, the disparity in aggravation levels between the military
cases and civilian-style cases remains virtually constant across the
period. As shown in Row 8, Columns C and D, military cases have
an average of 1.8 aggravating factors in both 1984-1990 and
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1991-2005. The disparity between the military and civilian-style
cases (Row 4 vs. Row 8) is 0.3 point (1.8-1.5) in Column C and 0.1
point (1.8-1.7) in Column D. Nothing in the number of aggravating factors in the cases suggests that the culpable conduct in the
civilian-style cases is sufficiently lower than the culpable conduct
found in the military cases after 1990 to explain the disparate
treatment of the two classes of cases over time.
Table 6 replicates the structure in Table 5 but maps the cases
using three culpability scales as measures of criminal culpability.
Part 1 maps the cases using a salient factors analysis to gauge culpability.96 Part 2 maps the cases using a scale derived from
logistic regression model of the advancement of cases to a capital
97
court martial. Part 3 maps the cases based on a logistic regres-

a

96.
The salient factors scale presented here is based on three salient factors measures
designed as part of the charging and sentencing study to capture what we perceive to be
military perceptions of criminal culpability based on the statistical evidence, discussions with
military officers, and our reading of the narrative summaries and records of the cases and
their charging and sentencing outcomes. We describe them as (1) the vileness factor, (2) the
accused/victim relationship factor, and (3) the high aggravation factor.
The vileness factor has three levels: low, medium, and high. The default is "low." An offender receives a "medium" classification if the case involves a rape, robbery, sodomy or
burglary, or a racial animosity motive. A case receives a "high" classification if it involves
multiple victims, an ambush, or a serious threat of death or bodily injury to non-decedent
victims. For the purpose of creating the six-level overall measure, the three levels are scored
0, 1, 2.
The accused/victim relationship factor has three levels: (1) victim is a family/acquaintance of the accused, (2) victim is a stranger to the accused, and (3) the victim is
a military police or commissioned officer. The third category is broader than the aggravating factor based on an officer victim because it includes officer victim cases whether or not
they were acting in the execution of their office. The data and the opinions of officers with
whom we have spoken suggest that killing an officer is a highly aggravated military offense
whether or not the officer is acting in the "execution" of his or her office. For the purpose
of creating the six-level overall scale, the three levels of this factor are also scored 0, 1, 2.
The third salient factor distinguishes between cases with a single statutory aggravating factor and multiple aggravating factors. For the purpose of creating the six-level overall scale,
the two levels of this scale are scored 0 and 1.
The procedure for creating the scale is modeled after one based on three comparable salient factor variables developed by Arnold Barnett with Georgia data from the 1970s. DAVID
C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS 575-77 (1990).
97.
As part of the charging and sentencing study, we developed four logistic regression
models using legitimate non-racial variables and race variables and used the fully specified
regression models to estimate a "culpability index" that reflected the probability of an adverse outcome (PHAT) on the basis of "race purged" legitimate variables for each member
of the relevant racial subgroups. We took three steps to purge the index of race effects. First,
we estimated the models with both racial and race neutral variables included in the model.
Second, we omitted the coefficients for the race variables in the construction of the culpability index. However, we used coefficients for the race neutral variables that had been
estimated in a model that included the race variables. This assures that the race neutral
variables will have no indirect racial effect on the index if they are highly correlated with the
race variables. On the basis of this culpability index, the average estimated probability of a
death sentence was 23% for minority accused, while the average estimated rate for wJ:iite
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sion analysis of death sentences imposed among all death eligible
98
cases.
The civilian-style cases appear slightly more aggravated in the
earlier period than in the later period in this table. Part 1, Line 7,
shows a 0.2-step decline. Part 2, Line 20, shows a 0.74-step decline.
Part 3, Line 32, shows a 0.51-step decline. It is hard to argue, however, that the modest decline in culpability seen here can explain
the steep turn away from capital prosecutions and sentencing in
the civilian-style cases after 1990. In no case does the average culpability decline more than one step on the scale.
Even the increased disparity between the average culpability of
civilian-style cases and the average culpability of military cases over
time does not seem sufficient to explain the change in practice.
This disparity is slightly larger according to these culpability scales
than according to the number of aggravating circumstances. The
largest disparity is 1.07 points in Part 1, mapping the salient factors
scale, where it increased from 1.23 to 2.30 (Line 7 minus Line 14
in Column C versus D).
It is also useful to estimate militaryI civilian-style murder disparities in charging and sentencing outcomes for the culpability
measures in Tables 5 and 6. For example, consider the comparative
treatment of cases in the two periods of military and civilian-style
murder with only one aggravator found or factually present in the
case. In the earlier period, as documented in Table 5, Column C,
Row 1, there were 23 civilian-style murder cases with only one aggravator. The convening authority sought the death penalty in 43%
of these cases (10/23) and obtained a death sentence in 13% of
the cases (3/23). In contrast, after 1990, the convening authority
sought the death penalty in only 9% of the 22 single aggravator
civilian-style murder cases (2/22) and none of them (0/22) resulted in a death sentence.

accused was 11 %. These predictions for each racially defined group of cases are known as
"standardized" estimates because they have been adjusted to account for the culpability level
of each case as determined by the culpability index produced by the regression analysis. To
build the scale, we sorted the cases into five levels based on the culpability index score estimated for each case. We then estimated a racial disparity within each cell and combined
those disparities to compute a weighted average of the disparities across all of the cells. Mantel-Haenszel is the procedure we use to create these overall estimates. See National Institute
of Standards & Technology, Mantel-Haenszel Test, http:/ /www.itl.nist.gov/div898/software/
dataplot/refmanl/auxillar/mantel.htm (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform).
The scale used to sort the cases in Part 2 of Table 6 is derived from the model focusing on
the decision of convening authorities to advance a case to a capital court martial.
98.
The scale used to sort the cases in Part 3 of Table 6 is derived from the model fo.
cusing on death sentencing outcomes among all death eligible cases.
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The same 1984-1990 versus 1991-2005 pattern appears after adjustment for the scales presented in Table 6. In the earlier period,
the convening authority sought a death penalty in 43% of the
thirty civilian-style murder cases in levels 0-2 of the salient factors
scale in Part 1 (13/30) and the accused received a death sentence
in four cases (13%). After 1990, the convening authority brought a
capital murder charge in 14% (5/36) of the civilian-style murder
cases at culpability levels 0-2 and, again, not a single (0/36) accused in the low- or mid-level cases received a death sentence after
1990.
Under the regression-based scale in Part 2, the convening authority sought a capital conviction in 12% (2/16) of the cases at
culpability levels 1 or 2 in the earlier period versus 4% in the later
period (1/27). One defendant at these levels of culpability received a death sentence in the earlier period (6%, 1/16) and none
received a death sentence in the later period (0/27). Finally in
Part 3, the decision to seek a capital court martial for the civilianstyle murder cases at culpability levels 1 and 2 falls from 42%
(5/12) before 1991to15% (4/27) after 1990, and, even if the civilian-style murder cases at the third and fourth levels of the scale are
included, not a single death sentence is imposed (0/44) after
99
1990.
The militaryI civilian disparities documented in Subsection A
cannot be satisfactorily explained by controlling for the culpability
of the cases.

C. The Declining Influence of Civilian Aggravators,
1984-1990 Versus 1991-2005

Over time, the major civilian aggravators in the 1984 executive
order also had a declining impact on charging and sentencing outcomes even among civilian-style murder cases. In this Section, we
demonstrate how three aggravating factors included in Rule 1004
and commonly found in state statutes lost influence over those
outcomes in civilian-style murders in 1984-1990 versus 1991-2005.
We focus first on the impact of the individual aggravators without
controlling for other factors bearing on culpability levels that
might influence the outcomes. The second Section controls for the

99.
In contrast, for the military cases, the higher death sentencing rate, 46% (6/13),
in the later period compared to 25% (1/4) in the earlier period is principally explained by
higher levels of aggravation among the military cases in the later period.
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number of victims, as well as for whether the aggravator of interest
was the only aggravator in the case.

1. A First Look at Three Important Aggravating Factors
Table 7, Column C compares death sentencing rates in 19841990 and 1991-2005 among all death eligible cases in the presence
of each of three aggravating factors.
First, consider the impact of the multiple-victim aggravating factor in Part I, which is the or one of the most important aggravating
factors in all state systems on which data are available. It is equally
important in civilian-style murder cases in our database. Fifty percent (4/8) of the death sentences for civilian-style murder were
imposed in multiple-victim cases, even though only 15% (12/79)
of all civilian death eligible cases have more than one victim. This
translates into a death sentencing rate of 33% (4/12) among all
civilian-style multiple-victim murder cases in our database.
Column C of Table 7 documents how this important aggravator
lost power in civilian-style cases after 1990. During the period
1984-1990, 37% (3/8) of civilian-style murder cases involving more
than one victim received a death sentence. This rate fell 12 points
to 25% (1/4) after 1990. An even more dramatic decline appears
in the initial charging decisions by the convening authority shown
in Part I, Column D of Table 7. Until 1990, the convening authority
sought a death sentence in every single case with more than one
victim (8/8). After 1990, this rate fell 75 points to 25% (1/4), a
disparity significant at the .02 level. This pattern also persists in the
rate at which cases advance to a capital sentencing hearing after a
unanimous finding of premeditated murder by the members. Table 7, Column E, illustrates the 50-point decline, from 75% (6/8)
to 25% (1/4).
Part II of Table 7 tells a similar story with respect to felony mur100
der cases. Between the two periods, Columns D and E indicate
that the rates at which such cases advanced to capital courts martial
and capital sentencing hearings fell 54- and 40-percentage points
respectively. Column C reports after 1990 an overall 20-point decline in the death sentencing rate among all felony murder cases.

100. "Felony murder" here refers to the premeditated murder with a felony aggravator
factor which appears in Rule 1004(c)(7)(B). The full text of the aggravating factor appears
in Table l.
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Part III reports a similar decline in the impact of the intentional
101
infliction of substantial harm aggravating factor. Column C indicates that the death sentencing rate for all such civilian-style
murders dropped 22 points, leaving a rate of only 3% (1/30) after
102
1990, a disparity significant at the .03 level.
Table 7, Column D documents the importance of the three aggravating factors in the decision by the convening authority to seek
a death sentence in a civilian-style case. Focusing again on Parts II
and III, the steep decline in importance of the felony murder aggravator and the intentional infliction of substantial harm
aggravator are evident. The felony murder aggravator capital
charging rate (Column D) fell from 75% (9/12) in 1984-1990 to
21 % (3/14) in 1991-2005, a 54-point decline that is significant at
the .02 level. With respect to the intentional infliction of
substantial harm, the capital charging rate fell from 58% (15/26)
in 1984-1990 to 20% (6/30) in 1991-2005, a 38-point decline that
is significant at the .005 level. In short, the convening authority's
assessment of cases with the most common civilian aggravators
shifted dramatically after 1990.
The pattern documented with respect to the diminished use of
these aggravators after 1990 continues through the decision to advance a case to a capital sentencing hearing. A case cannot move
from a capital court martial to a capital sentencing hearing unless
there is a unanimous finding of guilt as to at least one death103
eligible offense. As documented in Table 7, Part II, Column E,
the rate that cases advance to a capital sentencing hearing for the
felony aggravator cases fell from 54% (6/11) to 14% (2/14), a 40point disparity significant at the .08 level. For cases involving the
intentional infliction of substantial harm aggravator in Part III, that
rate of advance fell from 50% (10/20) during 1984-1990 to 10%
(3/30) after 1990, a 40-point disparity significant at the .003 level.

101. The intentional infliction of substantial harm factor appears in Rule
1004(c) (7) (I). The full text of the aggravating factor appears in Table 1.
102. This disparity persists even after excluding cases that involved more than one victim. In the period 1984-1990, 20% of the single-victim cases with the intentional infliction
of substantial harm received a death sentence. After 1990, none of 29 cases advanced to a
death sentence, a 20-point drop in selection rates. The disparity is significant to the .03 level.
l 03. See supra text accompanying note 76.
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2. A Closer Look at the Same Aggravating Factors
in Single-Victim Cases
This Section focuses on the declining impact of the felony murder and intentional infliction of substantial harm aggravating
factors after 1990 that we considered in Table 7 with the analysis
limited to single-victim civilian-style murder cases. The first analysis
presented in Table 8 documents the declining impact of those two
aggravators on convening authority decisions that advance
single-victim civilian-style murder cases to a capital court martial
with the government seeking a death sentence. The second analysis presented in Table 9 replicates the Table 8 analysis with the
focus on the impact of the two aggravators of interest on death
sentencing outcomes among all death eligible single-victim cases.
In both of these tables, we report the declining impact of the
two aggravators of interest among all cases in which they are
present (Column C), as well as among the cases in which they are
the only aggravating factor from Rule 1004 present in the case
(Column D). In each table, Part I presents the results for the
felony murder aggravator while Part II presents the results for the
intentional infliction of substantial harm aggravator. The following
two Sections examine the evidence presented in Tables 8 and 9.

a. Evidence of the Declining Impact of the Felony
Murder Aggravating Factor After 1990

Table 8, Part I, Column C illustrates that, among all cases with
the felony murder aggravator found or present, the death sentencing rate declined from 12% (1/8) in the earlier period to 0%
(0/12) in the later period. The chief explanation for this decline is
the drop in the rates at which these cases advanced to a capital
court martial (shown in Table 9, Column C), from 67% (6/9) in
the earlier period to 17% (2/12) in the later period. This
50-point disparity is significant at the .03 level. The decisions of
members in the capital sentencing hearings, which are not shown
in either table, also contributed to the decline from a death sentencing rate of 50% (4/8) in the earlier period to an 8% rate
104
(1/12) in the later period.
104. The declines documented with respect to single-victim cases persist when the
analysis includes single- and multiple-victim cases. In civilian-style cases with the felony aggravator present, the death sentencing rate falls from 25% (5/20) to 3% (1/30), a 22-point
decline that is significant to .05. The capital court martial rate declines from 58% (15/26) to
20% (6/30). This 38-point decline is significant to .01.
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Table 8, Part I, Column D tells a similar story for the cases in
which the felony murder aggravator is the only aggravating factor
found or factually present in the case. It documents a decline in
the death sentencing rate from 25% (1/4) to 0% (0/3). Table 9,
Part I, Column D documents a decline in the rates that civilianstyle cases advanced to a capital court martial from 100% (4/ 4) in
the earlier period to 0% (0/3) in the later period. Again the
100-point decline in the rates at which cases advance to a capital
sentencing hearing is significant at the .03 level. The members'
death sentencing rates in the capital sentencing hearings for these
cases, which are not shown in either table, declined from 50%
105
(2/4) in the earlier period to 0% (0/3) in the later period.
Since 1984, a death sentence has been imposed in only one civilian-style case involving only a felony murder aggravator. This was
the case of Todd Dock (1984; 1989), which also happens to have
106
been the first death eligible case prosecuted under the new law.
On its face, the facts of Dock clearly make it death eligible. However, between that prosecution and 1991, three more single-victim
felony murder cases advanced to a capital sentencing hearing (including Dock on remand) and all were sentenced to life
107
imprisonment.
Two additional single-victim felony aggravator
cases advanced to a capital sentencing hearing in 1993 and each
108
was sentenced to life imprisonment. Since then, no single-victim
felony aggravator case has advanced to a capital sentencing hearing, and Dock stands as the only such case to have received a death
sentence since 1984.

b. Evidence of the Declining Impact of the Intentional Infliction
of Substantial Harm Aggravating Factor After 1990

Part II of Tables 8 and 9 presents a similar analysis of the even
larger pool of single-victim civilian-style murders-the intentional
infliction of substantial harm cases. Table 8, Column C documents
a decline in the death sentencing rate among all civilian-style death
eligible cases with the substantial harm factor found or present in
the case-from 20% (3/15) in the earlier period to 0% (0/29) in
105. Disparities also exist with respect to death sentencing rates (22% to 0%) and capital court martial rates (42% to 8%) when the analysis incorporates single- and multiplevictim cases.
106. Dock's crime was committed two months before the effective date of the executive
order.
107. The other two cases were Mobley (1987) and Miller (1987).
108. Adams, Taylor.
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the later period.1 Again, this is substantially explained by a decline
in the capital court martial rate from 48% (10/21) (shown in Table
9, Column C) in the earlier period to 17% (5/29) in the later period, a 31-point decline that is significant at the .05 level. For the
cases with only the substantial harm aggravator present, Table 9,
Column D documents a decline in the capital court martial rate
from 42% (5/12) in the earlier period to 8% (1/12) in the later
. d .110
peno
The case summaries in Table 3 indicate that Turner (1985),
Thomas (1988), and Gibbs (1990) are the only death sentences
imposed in a substantial harm civilian-style case since 1984, and
each of these decisions issued before 1991. Before 1992, four other
substantial harm cases that advanced to a capital sentencing hearing, but not to a death sentence, resulted in a life sentence, as did
111
one in 1998. Since then, no substantial harm single-victim case
has advanced to a capital sentencing hearing.
This analysis explains why 87% (7 /8) of the death sentences in
civilian-style murders since 1984 were imposed prior to 1991. It
also explains why the contemporaneous felony and the substantial
harm aggravating factors, which are present in the vast majority of
the single-victim cases, have had so little impact on the death sentencing outcomes from 1984 through 2005.
Further evidence of the resistance of the military to the civilianization of capital punishment is that the two death sentences
disapproved by the convening authority, Melvin Turner and Curtis
112
Gibbs, were distinctly civilian-style murders involving only the
substantial harm aggravator. Moreover, in two other civilian-style
death sentenced cases that were remanded by a military court, the
death sentence was taken off the table in one case by the conven113
ing authority (Joseph Thomas)
and in another case by court
members who returned a life sentence on retrial and resentencing
114
(Todd Dock). Moreover, of the seven offenders sentenced to

109. This 31-point disparity is significant at .05.
110. Similar disparities appear in a parallel analysis including single- and multiplevictim cases. The death sentencing rate falls from 27% to 7%. The capital court martial rate
falls from 75% to 21 %. This 54-point disparity is significant to .05. When the substantial
harm aggravator is the sole aggravator in the case, death sentencing falls from 25% to 0%
and the capital court martial rate falls from 100% to 0%. Again the later 100-point disparity
is significant to .05.
111. The four cases before 1992 are Mobley (1987), Miller (1987), Poertner (1987),
and Gonzalez (1988). The 1998 case is Roukis.
112. Table 3, Cases 2, 8.
113. Table 3, Case 6.
114. Table 3, Case 1.
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death for civilian murder between 1984 and 1990, only two (each
with two victims) remain on death row. 115
We believe that the foregoing evidence clearly establishes that,
for the first five years of the new system, there was an effort to conform the military's use of its death penalty to the civilian model
embodied in the 1984 executive order, but since 1990, the effort
largely has been abandoned and the use of the death penalty has
been confined almost exclusively to cases with significant military
implications.

V.

POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE DISPARATE TREATMENT OF
MILITARY AND CIVILIAN MURDER

There are a number of possible explanations for the post-1990
decline of support for the capital prosecution of civilian-style murder cases. The first is a lack of incentive for convening authorities
to seek death in run-of-the-mill civilian-style murders, especially
those with a single victim. Unlike elected civilian prosecutors for
whom a tough on crime policy may be an important way to promote one's career, flag officers and commanding generals likely
see little professional advantage from such prosecutions. However,
when the authority and effectiveness of the military mission is
threatened, convening authorities are likely to be under the same
sort of pressure to maintain discipline that civilian prosecutors are
under to deliver justice with a death sentence in highly aggravated
civilian cases.
In terms of identification with the 1984 aggravating factors, one
can imagine how commanders, particularly in the combat units
from which the majority of the death eligible cases arise, can identify with the commissioned officer victim cases, while having much
less concern with death eligible cases whose Rule 1004 aggravating
factors do not implicate military discipline.
It has also been suggested that the first Gulf War, which began in
August 1990, may have shifted the values of commanders. While
U.S. military personnel engaged in a handful of short-term engagements previously, "the Gulf War was warfare on a grand scale"
116
for the first time in decades. Once troops engaged in active com-

115. Loving (1989) and Gray (1988). The death sentence for Murphy, with three vie·
tims, was set aside on appeal subject to reinstatement on remand. Until it is reinstated, he is
no longer on death row.
116. PETER HUCHTHAUSEN, AMERICA'S SPLENDID LITTLE WARS: A SHORT HISTORY OF
U.S. MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS: 1975-2000 151 (2003) (noting among other things that the
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bat, commanders may have focused on things that really matter to
the military, which do not include civilian-style murders.
Opposition to capital punishment in Western Europe may also
have had an impact on commanders. All countries in the European Union and any country seeking to join the European Union
117
must abolish the death penalty. Many European countries have
been active in advocating for international abolition of the death
penalty. Tension around this issue came to the fore in the late
118
1980s and early l 990s.
For example, tension between the United States and West Germany, which have concurrent jurisdiction over crimes involving
U.S. military personnel in Germany, was particularly pronounced
in 1989. In November 1984, a court martial imposed a death sentence on Todd Dock for a civilian murder committed in
119
Germany. After Dock, German officials issued several statements
suggesting that they would refuse to yield jurisdiction to the U.S.
military in cases involving military personnel at risk of capital punishment. Moreover, in May 1989, German officials recalled their
waiver of jurisdiction in a case concerning two soldiers accused of
attempted rape and a heinous murder of a German woman, and
120
tried the soldiers in German courts. The German authorities had
requested letter assurances from the U.S. military authorities stating that it was "unlikely that the soldiers would be sentenced to
121
death by a court-martial." U.S. authorities refused to issue the
letter and Germany recalled jurisdiction. 122
While Germany did not assert jurisdiction uniformly over all
cases in which the accused might face the death penalty, 123 tension
Gulf War "required the largest mobilization of U.S. Reserve and National Guard components since the Korean War" and resulted in a "massive victory").
117. See John E. Parkerson, Jr. & Carolyn S. Stoehr, The U.S. Military Death Penalty in Europe: Threats frrrm Recent European Human Rights Developments, 129 MIL L. REv. 41, 41-45
(1990) (discussing the evolving tensions between European nations hosting U.S. military
bases and the U.S. military authorities over the death penalty).
118. See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439 (1989) (holding that Jens
Soering may not be extradited to Virginia to stand trial for murder unless the risk of a death
sentence had been removed); see also Kellee A. Brown & Sophia A. Muirhead, Extradition:
Divergent Trends in International Cooperation, 33 HARV. INT't. LJ. 223 (1992) (discussing several
similar cases).
119. United States v. Dock, 26 MJ. 620 (A.C.M.R. 1988); see Parkerson & Stoehr, sufrra
note 117, at 54.
120. Rosemary Sawyer, German to Try 2 Gis in Murder Case: Won't Risk Possib/,e CourtMartialDeath Sentence, STARS AND STRIPES, Aug. 18, 1989, at 28.
121. Parkerson & Stoehr, sufrra note 117, at 57.
122. Id. at 57-58; see also Sawyer, sufrra note 120, at 28.
123. In the case of Army Sergeant James T. Murphy, in 1989, German officials and U.S.
military officials accused Murphy of the premeditated murder of his estranged wife, their
twenty-one-month-old son, and her five-year-old son from a previous marriage. United States
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lurked both in West Germany and in other Western European
124
countries. The German position drew additional support from a
1993 amendment to the treaty allowing U.S. armed forces to be
stationed in Germany. Parties to this amendment, including the
United States, agreed not to "carry out a death penalty in [Germany] nor carry through such a prosecution which may lead to the
125
imposition of such a sentence in [Germany]." A non-capital referral may have come to be seen as a small price to pay to avoid the
diplomatic incidents that capital referrals in civilian military mur126
ders produced in the 1980s.
The evidence is consistent with this hypothesis. Before 1990,
commanders in Western Europe capitally referred 59% (10/17) of
the civilian-style murder cases prosecuted in Western Europe, but
from 1990 through 2005, none (0/7) of the civilian-style cases
from Western Europe were capitally referred. This explanation
cannot, however, account fully for the discrepancies documented
above. Even after the European cases are removed from consideration, a 39-point civilian-style versus military disparity, significant at
the .005 level, persists in the decision to seek a capital court martial, 127 and a 20-point disparity, significant at the .07 level, persists in
128
death sentencing among all death eligible cases.
A third possible explanation turns on a cost-benefit analysis that
weighs the time and expense of a capital prosecution against the
likelihood that members will return a death verdict and a death
sentence actually imposed will ever be executed. A 1990 case illusv. Murphy, 30 MJ. 1040 (A.C.M.R. 1990); see also Paul H. Turney, New Developments in Military
Capital Litigation: Four Cases Highlight the Fundamentals, ARMY LAW., May 2000, at 103, 107-09.
The West German government expressed opposition to the death penalty and sought assurances from the United States that Murphy would not be subjected to the death penalty.
Richard]. Wilson, Using International Human Rights Law and Machinery in Defending Borderless
Crime Cases, 20 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1606, 1617 (1997). Despite these concerns, the German
prosecutor surrendered jurisdiction to the United States and a capital court martial held in
Germany sentenced him to death. Murphy, 30 MJ. at 1045.
124. Parkerson & Stoehr, supra note 117, at 58.
125. Agreement of 3 August 1959, as amended by the Agreements of 21 October 1971,
18 May 1981, and 18 March 1993, to supplement the agreement between the parties to the
North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces with Respect to Foreign Forces
Stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany (Done at Bonn Mar. 18, 1993; entered into
force Mar. 29, 1998; ratification Belgium, Feb. 27, 1998) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Youngberg, 38 MJ. 635, 636 (A.C.M.R. 1993) ("German
authorities asserted immediate investigatory and prosecutorial control in this case and refused to release jurisdiction until they were assured in writing that the death penalty would
not be an option at appellant's trial."), aff'd, 43 MJ. 379 (C.A.A.F. 1995). See generally Alyssa
K. Dragnich, Development, jurisdictional Wrangling: US Military Troops Overseas and the Death
Penalty, 4 CHI.J. INT'L L. 571 (2003).
127. The disparity is 68% (13/19) in 1984-1990 versus 29% (15/51) after 1990.
128. The disparity is 32% (6/19) in 1984-1990 versus 12% (6/51) after 1990.
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trates the concern about the inclination of court martial members
to impose a death sentence in the typical civilian-style murder. In
the case of Oscar Anderson, the accused, in a fit of sexual jealousy
(he believed his wife was seeing other men), brutally stabbed his
wife multiple times in the presence of his nine-year-old daughter
and left her to bleed to death.
The Article 32 investigating officer recommended a non-capital
charge because, in his words, "There is no realistic expectation of
129
the death sentence being imposed in this case." However, the
convening authority, an Air Force lieutenant general, accepted the
Staff Judge Advocate's contradictory recommendation for a capital
130
referral. In the capital court martial, the members failed to find
premeditation unanimously, which took death off the table. Indeed, the data document that members more frequently took
death off the table in this manner after 1990 than between 1984
and 1990. In the earlier period, members were not unanimous on
premeditation in 23% (5/22) of the civilian cases in which the
convening authority brought the case to a capital court martial.
This rate increased to 37% after 1990 (3/8).
In contrast to civilian jurors for whom capital defendants are
normally complete strangers, members in a capital court martial
are also members of the accused's military organization. Moreover,
enlisted members may be more able to understand the circumstances of the accused's situation that resulted in the murder than
their counterparts on a civilian jury. This may also reflect shifting
values subsequent to the engagement of ground forces in the Gulf
War.
On the likelihood of an execution, one can assume that convening authorities are aware that no one has been executed in the
military since 1961. Some convening authorities may also be aware
(a) that no single-victim civilian accused remain on death row, and
(b) that only two of the twelve civilian murder accused prosecuted
for multiple-victim murders since 1984 remain on death row.
An alternative explanation that might be proposed is the role of
the availability of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole
since 1997. This, however, seems an unlikely explanation. First, the
sentencing option became available seven years after the observed
shift in policy. Second, only four of the seventeen civilian-style
murder cases prosecuted after November 18, 1997 received a life
129. Report from Officer Wade B. Morrison to Commander Michael C. Short in the
Case of Oscar Anderson, Jr., Investigation Office's Report (of Charges Under Article 32,
UC~ and R.C.M. 405, Manual for Courts-Martial) 6 (May 25, 1990) (on file with author).
130. Recommendation of StaffJudge Advocate to Convening Authority in Case of Oscar
Anderson 2-3 (June 6, 1990) (on file with author).

602

University of Michigan Journal of Law &form

[VOL. 43:3

131

without parole sentence. The convening authority did not seek
the death penalty in any of these cases. As a result, none of the sentences were imposed in a capital sentencing hearing.
Overall, the military approach to civilian murder approximates
the approach of many civilian prosecutors in large urban communities. With resources scarce and the prospects of a death sentence
and execution uncertain, capital prosecutions are limited to highly
aggravated, highly publicized cases that clearly implicate the interests of justice in civilian eyes. For the military convening authorities,
the calculus appears quite comparable, with the overriding concern
being the maintenance of discipline and the protection of the au132
thority and effectiveness of the military command.

CONCLUSIONS

The evidence presented in this Article documents another chapter in the resistance of the U.S. armed forces to the civilianization
of military criminal justice. In spite of an 1984 executive order that
defined death eligible murder in the armed forces principally in
terms of civilian murder modeled after state law systems, the military, in its administration of the death penalty since 1990, has
applied a dual system in which there is a large disparity in the
weight it places on military as contrasted to civilian-style murder.
In this process, the military death penalty has come to be used
almost exclusively as a disciplinary vehicle to protect the authority
and effectiveness of the military command. This disparity in the
treatment of civilian and military murder in terms of the aggravating factors in the 1984 executive order substantially implicates
equal justice in the administration of the military death penalty.
Some have argued more broadly that it may be time to refocus the
133
military justice system on military crimes. This study supports that
argument. On the basis of this record, it may be appropriate for
the President to consider amending Rule 1004 to bring it in line
with the central purpose of the military criminal justice system,
that of advancing efficient command and control of the armed
forces.
131. Coleman, Dobson, Grandy, Ronghi.
132. This pattern continued in a New York National Guard case where the convening
authority rejected an offer to plead guilty to murdering two of his officers in Iraq in June
2005 in exchange for avoiding the death penalty. Paul von Zielbauer, G.l. Offered to Plea
Guilty, Then Went Free in Iraq Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2009, at Al. Instead, the convening
authority, an Army general, brought the case to a capital court martial. Id. The accused, Staff
SgL Alberto B. Martinez, ultimately was found not guilty by the court martial members. Id.
133. Turley, supra note 11, at 765--68.
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1

LIST OF AGGRAVATING FACTORS FROM RULE

1004(c)

Premeditated Murder Aggravating Factors [Article 118(1 )]:

1.

"The accused was serving a sentence of confinement for 30 years or more or for life at the time of
the murder." (7)(A)'"

2.

"The murder was committed: while the accused was engaged in the commission or attempted
commission of any robbery, rape, rape of a child, aggravated sexual assault, aggravated sexual
assault of a child, aggravated sexual contact, aggravated sexual abuse of a child, aggravated
sexual contact with a child, aggravated arson, sodomy, burglary, kidnapping, mutiny, sedition, or
piracy of an aircraft or vessel; or while the accused was engaged in ... any offense involving the
wrongful distribution, manufacture, or introduction or possession, with intent to distribute, of a
controlled substance; or, while the accused was engaged in flight or attempted flight after the
commission or attempted commission of any such offense." (7)(B)

3.

"The murder was committed for the purpose of receiving money or a thing of value." (7)(C)

4.

''The accused procured another by means of compulsion, coercion, or a promise of an advantage,
a service, or a thing of value to commit the murder." (7)(0)

5.

''The murder was committed with the intent to avoid or to prevent lawful apprehension or effect an
escape from custody or confinement." (7)(E)

6.

"The victim was the President of the United States [etc.]." (7)(F)

7.

"The accused then knew that the victim was any of the following persons in the execution of office:
a commissioned, warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer of the armed services of the United
States; a member of any law enforcement or security activity or agency, military or civilian,
including correctional custody personnel; or any firefighter." (7)(G)

8.

"The murder was committed with intent to obstruct justice." (7)(H)

9.

"The murder was preceded by the intentional infliction of substantial physical harm or prolonged,
substantial mental or physical pain and suffering to the victim." (7)(1)

10.

''The accused has been found guilty in the same case of another violation of Article 118." (7)(J)

11.

"The victim of the murder was under 15 years of age." (7)(K)

12.

"[T)he offense was committed in such a way or under circumstances that the life of one or more
persons other than the victim was unlawfully and substantially endangered ... ." (4)

13.

"[T)he accused was the actual perpetrator of the killing or was a principal whose participation in
the burglary, sodomy, rape, rape of a child, aggravated sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault
of a child, aggravated sexual contact, aggravated sexual abuse of a child, aggravated sexual
contact with a child, robbery, or aggravated arson was major and who manifested a reckless
indifference for human life." (8)

14.

"[T]he offense was committed in such a way or under circumstances that the life of one or more
persons other than the victim was unlawfully and substantially endangered ... ." (4)

Felony Murder Aggravating Factors [Article 118(4)]:

134. The numbers and letters in parentheses following each aggravating factor indicate
its location in Rule 1004(c).
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1

CAPITAL CHARGING AND SENTENCING OUTCOMES AMONG
DEATH-ELIGIBLE CASES: UNITED STATES MILITARY

(1984-2005)

Stage 1
Case Advances to a Capital Court Martial
1A

Yes:
42% 40/96

No:
58% (56/96)

Stage 2

2

2A

Case Advances ·
to a Capital Sentence Hearing
After a Unamimous Capital
Murder Conviction
Yes:
75% (30/40)

No:
58% (56/96)

Stage 3
3
Capital Sentencing
Hearing
.,___D_e_ci....
si....
on..,...._....,-t-_4_ Death Sentencing Rate Among
3A
3B
All Death Eligible Cases: 16% (15/96)
Death:
Life:
50%
50%
(15/30)
(15/30)
1

The cases of the eight accused acquitted of capital murder by members are
not included in this figure. However, their cases are included in the analysis of
convening authority charging decisions.
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2

INVENTORY OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN DEATH ELIGIBLE

MURDERS PROSECUTED IN THE

U.S.

ARMED FORCES

(1984-2005)

Part One: Military Murders
I. Commissioned Officer Victim

A. Racially Motivated Revenge
-Curtis, Ronnie

1987'"

killed his officer in charge and the officer's wife because
of the officer's racist comments

-Garraway, Mitchell

1986

killed his officer in charge for denying promotion and for
perceived racial injustice

-Quintanilla, Jessie

1996

killed his executive officer and nearly killed commanding
officer because of perceived racial mistreatment

B. Frustration with Military Unit or Military in General
-Akbar, Hassan

2005

attacked unit after hearing perceived threat against Iraqi
women by his unit, killing a captain and a major, and
wounding 14 others

-Kreutzer, William

1996

fired on drill formation, killing a major and wounding
many others

1988

killed disbursing officer of his ship to facilitate robbery of
ship's safe

1986

killed officer he met on street shortly after releasing self
from psychiatric ward

C. Financially Motivated
-Colon, Ruben
D. Other
-Tarver, Leon

II. Threat to the Authority and Effectiveness of the Military Command

A. Racially Motivated Murder
-Adams, Joseph
-Brown, Frederick
-Curry, Michael
-McDonald, Terrance
-Parker, Kenneth
-Walker, Wade
(these six individuals were coperpetrators in the same crime)

1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993

killed a white Marine Lance Corporal for perceived
injustices done to black marines by white Marines
thereby creating a risk of racial conflict among the troops

B. Non-Commissioned Officer Victim
-Ameen, Arif

1987

killed an NCO during an academic counseling meeting

-Bowley, Jacob

2000

killed a platoon sergeant (NCO) while rescuing his friend
(who was detained for drunkenness)

-Burkes, Sr., Donald R.

1989

killed an NCO believing that the victim was a
homosexual and child molester and wanting to punish
him

-Groveman, Garry J.

1987

killed an NCO by beating and stabbing

-Levell, Victor

1992

killed an NCO in an altercation

-Simoy, Jose

1992
2000

killed a sergent (NCO) military police officer during an
armed robbery of cash deliveries to a bank on an Air
Force base

135.

Year of sentencing.
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Part Two: Civilian-Style Murders
I. Family and Intimate Victims

A. Child Killed in Retaliation for Conduct of Spouse
-Brown, Jerry

2002

killed child after learning of his wife's infidelity

-Curry, Kirklan

1988

killed child to get back at his wife for leaving him

-Morgan, Lillie

2002

killed two children after learning of her husband's
infidelity

-Thomas, Frederick

1998

killed son after seizing the child and fleeing a scene in
which he also attempted to kill his wife and son

-Turner, Melvin

1985

killed child to retaliate for his wife's infidelity

B. Spouses, Girlfriends, or Paramours Killed
1. Due to Sexual Jealousy
-Anderson, Oscar

1990

killed wife after learning of her infidelity

-Forrest, Jason

1998

killed wife after learning of her infidelity

-Gonzalez, Juan

1988

killed wife after learning she planned to leave him for
another man

-Hamilton, Jr. Will. M.

1994

killed wife after suspecting infidelity

-Roukis, Peter

1998

killed wife after learning of her infidelity

-Strom Mark

1987

killed wife after learning of her infidelity

-Walford, Charlie

1988

killed wife after learning of her infidelity

1987

killed girlfriend after he could not get an erection, then
raped her

2. Due to Sexual Frustration
-Miller, Richard

3. To Accommodate an Ongoing Affair/Relationship
-Davis, Christian

1993

killed wife after conspiring with his girlfriend

-Fricke, Michael

1994

killed wife, fearing that she would learn of his affair,
divorce him, and take their son

4. In Response to Divorce, Separation, or Custody Negotiations
-Coffey, William

1991

killed wife during dispute over separation papers

-Lipscomb, William

1990

killed wife while finalizing divorce (also raped her)

-Murphy, James

1987

killed wife during custody argument, then killed three
children, including his son

-Paalan, Michael

1996

killed girlfriend after she intended to leave him with their
son

-Patterson, Eddie

1995

killed girlfriend after an argument over the status of their
relationship

-Ramirez-Silvano, Laz

1995

killed wife to prevent her from leaving him

-Smith, Donald

1985

killed wife after an argument over the possibility that his
wife would leave him with their children

-Snodgrass, Joseph

1991

procured killing of his wife after he was angered by a
divorce/custody settlement

-Ward, Timothy

1999

killed former wife after losing custody of their child to her
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5. Due to a Dispute Escalating to Violence
-Bartlett, David

2002

killed wife after argument over internet pornography

-Fuhrman, James

2000

killed wife during an argument, then killed his adopted
son

-Justice, Allen

1989

killed wife after she refused to loan him money

-Metz, Stephen

1989

killed wife during an argument

-Whitehead, Edward

1988

killed servicewoman paramour during an allegedly
consensual sexual liaison when the two argued

-Willis, Jeromy

1993

killed wife after she agreed to testify against him for
attempted murder

6. To Collect Insurance on Life of the Deceased
-Gamer, Charles

1992

killed wtte

-Kaspers, Clayton

1993

killed wife

-Thomas, Joseph

1988

killed wife

-Ayala, Jesus

1984

killed wife, reason unknown

-Lobson, Kimberly

2000

killed husband, allegedly because he was abusive

7. Other

II. Murder of Acquaintances or Strangers

A. In an Honor Killing to Protect Status/Reputation
-Fell, Thomas

1989

killed cross-dressing male after male had performed oral
sex on him and he discovered the victim's sex

-Fisher, Justin

2000

helped Glover kill a serviceman who had bested Glover
in an earlier fight

-Glover, Calvin

1999

killed a serviceman after losing a fight to him and
enduring ridicule by another servicemen

-Seay, Bobby

1999

killed victim (V) who was in a shoving match with Seay's
girlfriend at a party

-Best, Jermine J.

1997

killed V in altercation following a bar fight

-Gibbs, Curtis

1990

killed V whom he had met at bar when V refused to get
out of car

-Martinez, Joel

1991

killed V because V was stealing money from their drug
operation

-Phillips, John

1986

killed V after V hit Phillips after he had kicked the V's dog

-Poertner, Keith

1987

killed V after V had made a pass at his wife

-Shelton, Darrell

1997

killed V after V fought with Shelton's roommate

-Taylor, Kenneth

1993

killed V, fearing V would sabotage his attempt to get
business funding

-Witt, Andrew

2005

killed Vs after Vs made harassing phone calls to him

-Holt, Kevin

1993

killed serviceman after the V spread word of a crime Holt
and other had committed

-Jiminez, Mark

1994

killed a serviceman to prevent him from testifying to
Jiminez's prior crime

-Ruiz, Kenneth

1995

killed a serviceman to prevent him from testifying to
Ruiz's prior crime

B. Due to Relatively Minor Altercation

C. To Silence a Potential Witness
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1994

killed a serviceman to prevent him from testifying to
Stelling's prior crime

1993
1992

killed a homosexual serviceman in a public restroom

-Meeks, Jeffery

1989

killed a friend and his girlfriend after the two began to
exclude Meeks

-Parker, Kenneth

1993
1994
1993

killed the spouse of Walker's paramour

1987

killed a serviceman and attempted to feign his death as a
suicide

1996
1997
1986
1987
1999
1984
1989
1987
2003
1985
1989
1996
1986
2003
1997
1989

killed serviceman before robbing him

-Franklin, Emery

1989

killed young girl after she would not consent to his sexual
advances

-Gates, Dwan

1991
2000
1994
1988
1986

killed V after raping her

-Stelling, Michael
D. In a Hate Crime
-Helvey, Terry
-Vins, Charles

helped another kill a homosexual serviceman in a public
restroom

E. Due to Jealousy

-Schap, Stephen
-Walker, Wade

killed V after learning of V's affair with his wife
procured the killing of his paramour's spouse

F. Motive Unknown
-Coder, Thomas
Ill. Financially Motivated Murder
-Antle, Darryl
-Bear, William
-Clark, Alan
-Chrisco, Jim D.
-Coleman, Hector
-Dock, Todd
-Hirsch Jeffery
-Humiston, Andrew
-Jordan.Spencer
-Loving, Dwight
-Pereira, Michael
-Reliford, Rocky
-Schroeder, Johathan
-Soto, Alejandro
-Stinson, Kent

killed serviceman before robbing him
killed serviceman and serviceman's wife to rob them
killed his sister for the purpose of receiving money
killed serviceman to obtain money
killed taxi driver during robbery
killed V to rob him
killed drunken serviceman while robbing him
killed serviceman to rob him
killed taxi drivers after robbing them
killed V to rob him
killed serviceman and serviceman's wife to rob them
killed drunken serviceman while robbing him
killed V before robbing him
killed V during robbery attempt

IV. Sexually Motivated Murder

-Grandy, James
-Graves, Ervin
-Gray, Ronald
-Mabie, Timothy
-Mobley, Gerald
-Ronghi, Frank
-Schlamer, Shannon
-Shiloh, Columbia
-Smith, Patrick

1987
2000
1995
1999
1995

killed V after raping her
killed V during rape attempt
killed two victims after raping them
killed V after she would not consent to his sexual
advances and then raped her
killed V during a rape
killed young girl during a rape
killed servicewoman after a rape
killed neighbor after raping her
killed young girl after raping her
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DEATH SENTENCED ACCUSED LISTED BY YEAR OF SENTENCE AND
TYPE OF OFFENSE, UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES

A

(1984-2005)

B

c

D

Name
Thumbnail Sketch

Year of
Sentence
1984

Crime
Type

1

Dock, Todd A.
A robbery murder of a cab driver killed with multiple stab wounds.

2

Turner, Melvin
A brutal murder of the accused's 11-month-old daughter with a razor blade.

1985

c

3

Murphy, James T.
Three victims. A brutal murder of the accused's wife and two children
whom he bludgeoned and drowned in a bathtub.

1987

c

4

Curtis, Ronnie A.
Two victims. Burglary, robbery and murder of the accused's commanding
officer and the officer's wife with multiple stab wonds in retaliation for racial
slights by the officer.

1987

M

5

Gray, Ronald A.
Two victims. The first was raped and stabbed seven times. The second
victim was raped and shot four times. There was also a non-decedent rape
victim.

1988

c

6

Thomas, Joseph L.
Brutal murder of accused's wife with a tire iron to collect insurance
proceeds.

1988

c

7

Loving, Dwight J.
Two victims. The first was a cab driver robbed and shot twice in the head.
The second victim was a cab driver robbed and shot once in the head. The
accused robbed and attempted to kill a third cab driver who escaped
unharmed.

1989

c

8

Gibbs, Curtis A.
A brutal killing of a female drinking companion who was nearly decapitated
with a sword.

1990

c

9

Simoy, Jose F.
The accused and four co-perpetrators robbed individuals delivering
proceeds to a bank on an airbase and in the process killed a police officer
with pipe blows to the head and nearly killed another person. The accused
was not the triggerperson.

1992

M

1993

M

1996

M

10 Parker, Kenneth G.

C'"

Two victims. Motivated by a believed racial attack on a black marine by
white marines, the accused and five co-perpetrators kidnapped, robbed
and killed with a shot to the heart the first white person they encountered, a
fellow marine. The accused was the shooter. The second victim was the
male spouse of the paramour of a Marine friend. The accused killed the
second victim with a shotgun blast to the chest.

11

Walker, Wade L.
Two victims. The accused, was a co-perpetrator of Kenneth Parker in both
of his murders. Walker prevailed upon Parker to kill the spouse of Walker's
paramour and was part of the group of marines who participated in the
killing of the first white person they could seize and kill. The accused was
not a trigger person in either of these murders.

136.

"C" indicates a civilian-style murder. "M" indicates a military murder.
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12

Kreutzer, William J.
A violent ambush attack with rifles on the accused's unit while it was in an
outdoor drill formation on an Army post killing an officer, a major, and
wounding serveral others, including at least one officer

1996

M

13

Quintanilla, Jessie A.
In retaliation for perceived discriminatory treatment, the accused killed his
executive officer with a shot in the back. The accused also attempted to kill
his commanding officer with a nearly fatal shot to his chest.

1996

M

2005

c

2005

M

14 Witt, Andrew
Two victims. Premeditated stabbing murder of an airman and the airman's
wife in revenge for phone call harassment and a charge of sexual
misconduct by the accused. The accused also stabbed four times a nondecedent victim airman who sought to stop the accused's attacks on the
decedent victims.

15

Akbar, Hassan K.
Two victims. At night in wartime, the accused feigned an attack on the unit
by rolling live had grenades into three tents with sleeping officers and
opened fire as the occupants fled their tents. Accused killed on officer with
a shot in the back. A second officer died of 87 shrapnel wounds. Accused
injured 14 other non-decedent military victims.
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DISPARITIES IN CHARGING AND SENTENCING OUTCOMES
BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN-STYLE DEATH ELIGIBLE
MURDER

(1984-2005):

OVERALL (PART

I)

SENTENCING YEAR (PARTS

A

c

B

Death Sentencing
Rate Among All
Death Eligible
Sentencing Year
Cases

Rate that
Advance to a
Capital Court
Martial

AND CONTROLLING FOR

II AND Ill)
D

E

Rate that Cases
Advanced to a Death Sentencing
Rate in 30 Capital
Capital
Sentencing
Sentencing
Hearings
Hearing

Part I. 1984-2005
1. Total Cases

16% (15/96)

42% (44/104)

31% (30/96)

50% (15/30)

2. Military

41%(7/17)

73% (14/19)

59%(10/17)

70% (7/10)

3. Civilian-Style

10%(8n9)

35% (30/85)

25% (20/79)

Diff."' 31 pts.**
Ratio"'4.1

4.

Diff. 38 pis. ***
Ratio2.1

Diff. 34 pis.**
Ratio 2.4

40%(8/20)
Diff. 30 pis.
Ratio 1.7

Part II. 1984-1990
5. Total Cases

22%(8/37)

62% (28/45)

49% (18/37)

44%(8/18)

6. Military

25% (1/4)

100%(6/6)

75% (3/4)

33% (1/3)

7. Civilian-Style
8.

21% (7/33)
Diff. 4 pis.
Ratio 1.2

56% (22/39)
Diff.44pts.
Ratio 1.8

45% (15/33)
Diff. 30 pis.
Ratio 1.7

47% (7/15)
Diff. -14pts.
Ratio .70

Part Ill. 1991-2005
9. Total Cases

12% (7/59)

27% (16/59)

20% (12/59)

58% (7/12)

10. Military

46% (6/13)

61% (8/13)

54% (7/13)

86% (617)

11. Civilian-Style

2%(1/46)

17% (8/46)

11%(5/46)

20% (1/5)

12.

Diff. 44 pts. ***
Ratio 23.0

Diff. 44 pis.***
Ratio3.6

Diff. 43 pts.**
Ratio4.9

Diff. 66 pis.*
Ratio4.3

Level of significance of disparity: *=.1 O; **=.05; ***=.01.

137. "Diff." reports the arithmetic difference between the rate for the military cases and
civilian-style cases.
138. "Ratio" reports the ratio of the two rates: (rate of military cases)/(rate of civilianstyle cases).
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TABLE 5
COMPARISON OF THE NUMBER OF RULE 1004AGGRAVATING
FACTORS IN CIVILIAN-STYLE AND MILITARY DEATH ELIGIBLE
MURDERS (1984-1990VERSUS 1991-2005)

c

D

1984-1990

1991-2005

B

A

percentage

n

percentage

n

1 aggravator

59%

23

48%

22

2

2 aggravators

33%

13

39%

18

3

3 or more aggs

4

Avg. No. of Aggravators

1

5

Civilian-Style

8%

3

13%

6

1.5 aggs

39

1.7 aggs

46

1 aggravator

17%

1

38%

5

6

2 aggravators

83%

5

46%

6

7

3 or more aggs

8

Avg. No. of Aggravators

Military

0%

0

15%

2

1.8 aggs

6

1.8 aggs

13

TABLE

6

COMPARISON OF SCALE-BASED CULPABILITY LEVELS IN CIVILIANSTYLE AND MILITARY DEATH ELIGIBLE MURDERS
(1984-1990 VERSUS 1991-2005)

A

c

B

D

1984-1990
percentage

1991-2005

n

percentage

n

Part 1-5alient Factors Analysis (FACTORS_SCL2X)
1

Civilian-Style

O(Low)

31%

12

33%

15

2

1

26%

10

35%

16

3

2

20%

8

11%

5

4

3

15%

6

20%

9

5

4

8%

3

2%

1

6

5 (High)

0

0

0%

0

1.44

39

1.24

46

0

0

0

7
8

Av. Culpability
Military

O(Low)

0

9

1

33%

2

0

0

10

2

0

0

23%

3

11

3

17%

1

31%

4

12

4

33%

2

23%

2

1

31%

4

6

3.54

13

13

5 (High)

17%

14

Av. Culpability

2.67
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c

B

A

D

1984-1990
percentage

613

1991-2005

n

percentage

n

Part 2--flegression Based Scale No.1 (CAS_SCL_B)
15

1 (Low)

18%

7

33%

15

16

2

23%

9

26%

12

17

3

13%

5

24%

11

18

4

23%

9

11%

5

19

5 (High)

23%

9

6%

3

20

Av. Culpability

3.10

39

2.33

46

21

Civilian-Style

1 (Low)

0

0

8%

1

22

2

0

0

15%

2

23

3

17%

1

15%

2

24

4

50%

3

31%

4

25

5 (High)

33%

2

31%

4

26

Av. Culpability

4.17

6

3.61

13

Military

Part 3-Regression Based Scale No.2 (DTH_W6_SCL)
1 (Low)

27%

9

33%

15

28

27

2

9%

3

26%

12

29

3

27%

9

17%

8

30

4

21%

7

20%

9

31

5 (High)

15%

5

4%

2

32

Av. Culpability

2.88

33

2.37

46

1 (Low)

0

33

Civilian-Style

25%

1

0

34

Military

2

0

0

15%

2

35

3

0

0

23%

3

36

4

25%

1

23%

3

37

5 (High)

50%

2

38%

5

38

Av. Culpability

3.75

4

3.84
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50 points

40 points'
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Cases from 1984-1990

25%

5/20

58%

15/26

50%

10/20

b.

Cases from 1991-2005

3%

1/30

20%

6/30

10%

3/30

c.

Disparity (Row 9-Row 10)

22 points"

Level of significance of disparity: ·= .10; "= .05; "'= .01.

38 points"'

40 points'"
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n

%

n

12%

1/8

100%

8/8
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0/12

25%

1/4

%

c.

Disparity (Row a-Row b)

II.

Intentional Infliction of Substantial Harm (71)

a.

Cases from 1984-1990

20%

3/15

22%

2/9

b.

Cases from 1991-2005

0%

0/29
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0/12

c.

Disparity (Row 9-Row 10)
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6/9

100%

4/4

b.
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2/12
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0/3

c.
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5/12
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31 points"

34 points

